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Kline, III: Evidence, Child Abuse - Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evide

CASE NOTES
EVIDENCE, CHILD ABUSE - Rule 404(b) of the Wyoming Rules of Evidence:
What Protection is Left After Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 802 (Wyo.
1980)?

Sometime during the morning or early afternoon of
October 31, 1979, two month old Alysia Snyder received a
blow to her head. The injury sent Alysia into a coma and
brought on violent life-threatening convulsions. Medical
testimony indicated that the injury was caused by "nonaccidential trauma," but there was no evidence as to the
time the injury was sustained. Neither parent accused the
other of inflicting the blow, nor did either one directly deny
responsibility for the injury. The only other witness was
the victim, who, of course, was unable to testify, being two
months old.1
When the jury retired to consider the state's case
against Gilbert Grabill, they had before them only the barest
circumstantial evidence' that would prove the charges of
child abuse.3 The evidence presented against Grabill to prove
he had abused Alysia Snyder on October 31, 1979 could
have been applied with equal strength against the child's
other parent.4 Yet the jury had little trouble finding Grabill
guilty, probably because of the testimony of previous instances of family violence allowed into evidence.5 This testimony was initially barred by the trial judge' as improper
"propensity evidence" disallowed under Rule 404(b) of the
1. Grabill v. State, 621 P.2d 806 (Wyo. 1980).
2. Id. at 806, 814.
3. WYO. STAT. § 6-4-504 (1977) provides:
Any adult who intentionally or in reckless disregard of the consequences causes violent physical injury or mental trauma to a child under
e age of sixteen (16) or commits any assault or assault and battery
upon the child to a degree as to require medical, psychological or psy-

chiatric treatment to heal or overcome the injuries or damages sustained
by the child, or who sexually molests a child under the age of sixteen (16)

is guilty of child abuse and upon conviction shall be sentenced to the state
penitentiary for a term of not more than five (5) years.
4. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 809-10, 814.
5. Id. at 816 (dissenting opinion).
at 13-15.
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Wyoming Rules of Evidence.7 However, the judge later
admitted it on rebuttal to impeach answers received during
the cross examination of the defendant.8
The testimony by Donna Snyder, Alysia's mother, and
by two of Gilbert Grabill's former wives alleged four instances of violence toward members of Grabill's family.
First, that in 1974, Grabill beat his four year old daughter
for a minor disobedience. Second, that several times during
1975, Grabill put his hand over the mouth of his six month
old son, Christopher, until the baby passed out. At the time,
he explained he was conducting an exercise to strengthen
the baby's lungs. Third, that in 1977, Grabill punished
Christopher for spilling talcum powder on a friend's pool
table by picking the child up by the neck and "hitting him
on the buttocks." Fourth, that in 1979, Grabill beat Donna
Snyder during an argument."9
On appeal, the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the
evidence that Grabill abused Alysia Snyder was sufficient
to go to the jury and to withstand a directed verdict in favor
of the defendant. In making that determination, the court
used the minimum standard: the evidence most favorable
to the prosecution was sufficient to draw "a reasonable
inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."1 In fact, the
court never referred to the evidence of prior bad acts in
ruling on the threshold of evidence it deemed necessary to
uphold the conviction. Nevertheless, it made it clear that
this evidence was crucial if the jury was to be able to determine both identity and the intent of the person who abused
the child. 1 The court held that the evidence of prior bad
7. Wyo. R. EviD. 404(b) provides:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
The WYOMING RULES OF EVIDENCE were adopted January 1, 1978. See,
Wyo. R. EVID., Order, In the Matter of Adoption. All the rules discussed
in this casenote are identical in wording to the corresponding FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE. (Hereinafter, the WYOMING RuLEs OF EVIDENCE will
be cited in the text simply as Rule [#]).
8. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 807.
9. Id. at 807, 815.

10. Id. at 803.

11. Id. at 809-10, 813.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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acts was admissible under Rule 404(b) even though the
trial judge, using the discretionary power inherent in the
rule, had rejected this rationale.' 2
This note will review the history of Rule 404(b) in
Wyoming and summarize the operation of the rule as it has
been interpreted in several jurisdictions and by the commentators. The note will then examine the basis on which
the evidence of prior bad acts was admitted and the theory
by which its admission was sustained on appeal. Following
this summary, a closer examination of the testimony of
prior bad acts admitted in Grabill will show that the evidence should not have been permitted under Rule 404(b).
Finally, it will become evident that the Wyoming Supreme
Court allowed the evidence to be admitted not because it
was reliable or highly probative but because in Grabill and
similar cases there is a lack of evidence. This note will argue
that the court's decision to admit the very kind of highly
prejudicial evidence that Rule 404 (b) was meant to prohibit will eventually destroy the protections of the rule in
the cases where they are most important.
THE WYOMING CASES

The principle that a person should not be convicted of
a crime by the use of evidence of an unrelated crime was
first applied in Wyoming in 1921 in Anderson v. State.18
After Anderson, the court has gradually refined the doctrine until in 1957, in State v. Lindsay, 4 the court announced
the standard in terms very close to those of the present Rule
404. Ten years later, in Valerio v. State, 5 the court reconfirmed the holding of Lindsay. In both Lindsay and Valerio,
the court sustained the introduction of evidence of prior
criminal acts-in Lindsay on the theory that it was part of
the res gestae of the crime,' 6 and in Valerio on the theory
12. Id. at 807. See also, Record on Appeal at 13-15.
13. Anderson v. State, 27 Wyo. 345, 373, 196 P. 1047, 1056 (1921).
14. State v. Lindsay, 77 Wyo. 410, 421, 317 P.2d 506, 510 (1957). [Hereinafter
cited in the text as Lindsay.]
15. Valerio v. State, 429 P.2d 317, 318 (Wyo. 1967). [Hereinafter cited in text
as Valerio.]
16. State v. Lindsay, supra note 14, at 510.
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that it verified the identity of the accused. 17 Both of these
theories are recognized exceptions to the basic exclusionary
rule listed in Rule 404(b). i
Wyoming adopted its present Rules of Evidence in
1978.10 The text of Rule 404, as well as that of Rules 401,
403 and 608 (all discussed in this note) are identical to the
text of the corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence.20 In
fact, while only a handful of cases in Wyoming cite the
recent Rule 404(b), in Wyoming and elsewhere similar
common law has existed since 1950.21
In Kwallek v. State,22 an assault and battery case, the
Wyoming court applied the general exclusionary provision
of Rule 404 to exclude evidence of similar previous conduct.
In doing so, the court rejected the contention that the evidence should be admitted under any of the exceptions listed
in Rule 404(b).2 Thus, with Kwallek, the Wyoming court

firmly established itself in the mainstream of the case law
on Rule 404.
Five months after Kwallek, in Elliott v. State,24 the
court was once again faced with the problem of applying
Rule 404 to evidence of previous misconduct. Elliott was
a prosecution for the sexual assault of a minor. In order
to buttress the child's testimony, the trial court allowed
evidence of previous similar assaults by Elliott on both
the child and her sister. The court voted unanimously to
17. Valerio v. State, supra note 15, at 318.

18. WYo. R. EVID. 404(b), supra note 7. See generally, LouISELL & MUELLER,

FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 140 (1978). [Hereinafter cited as LOUISELL & MUELLER].
19. See note 7, upra.
20. The Federal Rules of Evidence were adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1975. LOUISELL & MUELLER, Vol. 1, Preface at iii (1977).

21. The leading U.S. Supreme Court case in the area dates from 1948. Michelson
v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948). The majority opinion by Mr. Justice
Jackson sets out the general rule of exclusion stated in Rule 404. Mr. Justice
Jackson also provides a clear explanation of the theoretical underpinnings
of the rule. This opinion is frequently cited in subsequent cases and by the
commentators. The opinion does not list the exceptions to the general rule
which are now found in subsection (b) of Wyo. R. Evid. 404, presumably
because the case did not require an examination of the exceptions.
22. Kwallek v. State. 596 P.2d 1372 (Wyo. 1979) [Hereinafter cited in the text
as Kwallek].
23. Id. at 1378, 1379.
24. Elliott v. State, 600 P.2d 1044 (Wyo. 1979). [Hereinafter cited in the text
as Elliott].
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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uphold the introduction of the evidence, but was divided
in its determination of which exception under Rule 404(b)
would justify admission of the evidence.25 Thus, if the court
disagreed on which exception to apply, it agreed that such
evidence was admitted almost universally in sexual assault
cases and cited twenty-five cases from other jurisdictions
to support that contention.2" The court seemed to be saying
that when considering the introduction of testimony of
previous crimes and bad acts, sexual assault cases were
different from other cases.
The court returned to this line of reasoning in deciding
Grabill,27 but did not cite any authority other than Elliott
for the proposition that child abuse cases deserved special
treatment under 404 (b). While the narrow holding of Elliott
and Grabill was that the evidence of prior bad acts fit an
accepted exception to Rule 404(b), a closer examination
will show that under the traditional standard, the evidence
should not have been admitted in Grabill. In fact, the court
appears to have allowed the evidence in Grabill primarily
in order to solve a problem that often arises in child abuse
cases: the lack of reliable evidence.
RULE 404(b) AND RELEVANCY
28
Rule 404(b) is one of the specialized relevance rules.
In order to understand 404(b) fully, it is important to keep

in mind both Rule 401,29 the basic relevancy rule, and Rule

403,10 its general limitation. Rule 401 announces the underlying proposition that evidence is relevant if it tends to make
the existence of a material fact more or less probable.3' Rule
403 sets up the conflict at the heart of all the subsequent
25. Id. Following the analysis in this note and in the sections entitled Intent,
and Motive, it becomes apparent that the concurring opinion by Justice
McClintock correctly applies Rule 404(b) to the facts of Elliott v. State.
See note 66.
26. Elliott v. State, supra note 24, at 1047, 1048.
27. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 810.
28. Id. at 809, citing WEINSTEIN & BERGER, 2 WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 404[08]
(1980). [Hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN.] See also LouISELL & MUELLER,
supra note 18, § 140 (1978), and WEINSTEIN, § 404[09] (1980).
29. Wyo. R. EvID. 401.
S0. Wyo. R. EVID. 403. See text accompanying note 32, infra.
and LouisE.L
& MUELLER
31. SeebyWYo.
R. EVID.of 401
Published
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relevancy rules by establishing limits on the admission of
relevant material:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of the cumulative evidence. 2
Thus, the main consideration indicated by Rule 403 is that
probative value of the evidence must outweigh the danger
of prejudice or misuse by the jury.3 Rule 404 (b) applies
this principle to the problem of whether testimony of collateral crimes or bad acts is admissible. Such evidence is not
permitted if it only shows the accused's propensity to commit the crime, but will be permitted to show "proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident."34
This evidence of prior acts is not excluded because the
evidence is deemed irrelevant. Rather, it is considered too
dangerous for the jury to consider, since a jury is liable to
accord the evidence too much weight and convict the accused
for being a bad person instead of for having committed the
crime. Thus, the likelihood of unfair prejudice is said to
outweigh the probative value of the evidence." Indeed, the
jury's knowledge of previous bad acts has been shown to be
a powerful factor in obtaining convictions on unrelated
charges.86
However, the use of the broad term "for other purposes"
in Rule 404 (b) insures that the list of elements of a crime
that may be proved by specific evidence of prior bad acts
is not limited to those stated in the rule: "It may, however,
be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
32.
33.
34.
35.

WYo. R. EVID. 403.
LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, §§ 126, 127.
Wyo. R. EVID. 404(b).
See LOUISELL and MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140.

36. KALvEN and ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 160-61
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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or absence of mistake or accident.1 37 Therefore, when a
policy favoring admissibility is coupled with the ingenuity
of an aggressive prosecutor, the basic protection of Rule 404
has frequently fallen. 8 It is thus essential that a trial judge
determine whether or not the evidence offered will indeed
tend to prove an element of the charge.3 The judge must
also weigh the probative value of the evidence against the
amount of unfair prejudice it will cause the defendant. This
second test, from Rule 403, should be a part of the judge's
discretionary consideration whenever evidence is offered.
How THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED AND APPEALED

The trial judge made an initial ruling on a motion in
limine that the evidence of previous violence was inadmissible
under Rule 404(b), but ruled that the evidence would be
allowed in on rebuttal if Grabill testified.4 0 When the prosecution questioned Grabill about the four instances of family
violence and Grabill denied them, the court allowed in rebuttal testimony from Donna Snyder, from two of Grabill's
former wives, and from a police officer." This is contrary
to the directive of Rule 608(b) which states:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for
the purpose of attacking or supporting his credibility, other than conviction of a crime as provided
in Rule 609 may not be proved by extrinsic evidence."
The purposes of this rule are to prevent the waste of time
involved in trying collateral issues and to protect the witness
from having to answer for acts unrelated either in time or
to the issues on trial. When the witness is a party to the
case, as in Grabill, there is the additional purpose of preventing unfair prejudice and jury misuse."
On appeal, the State conceded that the evidence of prior
family violence by Grabill would not be admissible under
37. Wyo. R. Evid. 404 (b), See also, LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140.
38.. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18. § 140.
39. WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at 404-45.
40. Record on Appeal at 15, Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 807.
41. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 807-08.
42. Wyo. R. EVID. 608.
at 239-40.
18, § 305, 1981
supra note
& MUELLER,
43. LOUISELL
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Rule 608.," However, the State argued that it should be admissible under Rule 404(b) to show intent, motive, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident." To
justify the use of the evidence of prior bad acts under the
new rationale, the court quoted from a recent Colorado
case: "Evidence which is admitted generally may be considered for any legal purpose for which it is admissible although the evidence, when introduced, was intended for a
particular purpose.""6 This rule would adequately explain
the broadened grounds for admissibility considered under
Rule 404(b) if the trial judge had ruled the evidence admissible under that rule. But it is not helpful in explaining
what should have been done when the evidence was erroneously admitted under one rule after the judge, exercising
his discretion, had rejected the evidence under the only rule
that would have authorized its admission.
In upholding Grabill's conviction, the Wyoming Supreme
Court allowed the introduction of the evidence under Rule
404(b) and refused to consider the problem of whether it
was properly admitted under Rule 608.2 Moreover, the court
ignored the trial judge's ruling that the evidence should not
be admissible under Rule 404 (b), a decision normally within
the discretion of the trial judge.4 The Wyoming Supreme
Court adopted an often cited characterization of the standard for admission of such evidence:
The principal test as to the admissibility of the
proffered evidence under Rule 404 (b) is whether or
not it tends directly to prove or disprove a consequential fact such as intent or knowledge or
whether or not it may tend to establish a proposition such as motive, which through a series of
44. Brief for Appellee at 25, Grabill v. State, supra note 1.
45. Id. at 25-28. The state's appellate argument broadened the claimed grounds
for the admissibility of the bad acts testimony. During the trial the prosecution argued only that the evidence would show notice and intent. Record
on Appeal at 2-13, Grabill v. State, supra note 1. That the court also considered whether the identity exception applied reflects the court's interest
in giving the rule a broad and liberal interpretation.
46. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 811, citing Westland Nursing Home, Inc.
v. Benson, 33 Colo. App. 245, 517 P.2d 862 (1974).
47. Id.
48. LouxSu..L & MuFLLm, supra note 18, § 125, at 9-12.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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inferences may tend to establish the probability of
a consequential fact. 9
A closer examination will show that the evidence of prior
acts should not have been admitted under either intent,
motive or identity.
INTENT

Intent is an element of the crime of child abuse, and
must be proved in order to obtain a conviction." Intent is
often defined as "merely the absence of accident." It is
frequently mentioned along with knowledge, but is meant
1
to signify something more than knowledge. Intent includes
the desire to achieve a particular result or, alternatively,
the knowledge that the result is the inevitable consequence

of an act. 2

The cases are in agreement that before evidence of
other bad acts can be admitted to prove intent, the issue of

intent must be in controversy in the case.5" Ordinarily, the
denial by the accused that he committed the criminal act
49. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 28, at § 404
[09].
50. Wyo. Stat. § 6-4-504 (1977).
The Wyoming statute provides that specific intent or reckless disregard be proved a conviction of child abuse can be obtained. The court
does not discuss whether the inclusion of reckless disregard in the statute
has any effect on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b). The
court's only use of "reckless disregard" follows a citation of the Wyoming
Statute and treats "reckless disregard" as being the same as intent. Grabill
v. State, supra note 1, at 809-10. There appear to be no Wyoming cases that
shed any light on the difference of proof in child abuse cases between
intent and reckless disregard.
Reckless disregard has been defined as being the knowledge that an
act has the high probability of causing a prohibited result, but it is less
than the certain knowledge that is usually understood by intent. La Fave &
Scott, Criminal Law § 30. Because reckless disregard involves the element
of an uncertain result, it is closely related to the defenses of accident or
mistake. If either accident or mistake had been at issue in the case then
evidence of similar prior bad acts would be admissible under Rule 404(b)
to prove reckless disregard. The argument against admitting the evidence
in Grabill v. State would be the same whether the evidence is introduced to
prove intent or to prove reckless disregard. In either case, the defense of
accident should have to be raised by the accused before intent or reckless
disregard could be contested by the prosecution. The question of fact to be
determined in Grabill v. State is neither the intent nor reckless disregard
of the accused but the identity of the child's assailant. See sections on
Intent and Identity in text.
51. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140, at 126.
52. Id. at 126, 133.
5& Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 809, citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 28,
§ 404[091.
Published
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would not be sufficient to raise the issue of intent. Unless
the accused raises a defense of accident or mistake, the
evidence of collateral bad acts will be excluded.54
In Grabill, the Wyoming court cited the rule that the
issue of intent must be controverted before evidence of collateral acts is admissible to prove intent.5 5 But the court departed from the majority of precedent when it held that
Grabill's claim that the injury was present when he first
looked in on the child was sufficient to raise the issue of
intent." Under the rule as construed in previous cases, even
a direct denial by the accused that he committed the act
would not open the issue of intent." The court did not discuss
this departure from precedent even though several of the
cases and all the commentators relied on by the court approve
of this rule."
In Harvey v. State," the Alaska Supreme Court held it
was reversible error in a prosecution for child abuse and
manslaughter for the trial court to admit evidence that the
defendant had severely beaten another of his children in an
incident unrelated to the one causing the child's death."0
Just as in Grabill,the central issue in Harvey was not intent
but who caused the injury." The court noted that to broaden
the intent exception in Rule 404(b) to include the proof of
general criminal intent would make such evidence admissible
in every crime that would be a felony at common law. To do
so, the Alaskan Court said, "would destroy the rule."6 "
The Alaska Supreme Court has correctly diagnosed the
danger that lies behind the holding in Grabill: if the intent
exception in Rule 404 (b) is read to allow proof of general
criminal intent, then the rule has no application in any trial
54. Harvey v. State, 604 P.2d 586, 590 (Alaska 1979).
55. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 809, citing WEINSTEIN, supra note 28,
at § 404[09].
56. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 809.
57. Harvey v. State, supra note 54, at 590.
58. See LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, at § 140; WEINSTEIN, supra note
28, at*§ 404[08]; and United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127. 134 (4th Cir.,
1973).
59. Harvey v. State, supra note 54 [Hereinafter cited in the text as Harvey].
60. Id. at 589-90.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 589.
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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of a serious crime. 6 The requirement that intent be specifically placed in controversy by the defendant's raising of a
defense of accident or mistake is an important part of Rule
404(b). It is worth noting that this point was not raised in
Grabill's appellate brief 4 and may not have been discussed
during oral argument.
Finally, the rule requires that collateral acts bear a
"substantial similarity" to the charged act before they can
be used to show intent.6 The incidents offered by the prosecution in Grabill are only marginally related to the act of
child abuse charged. Certainly, the testimony that Grabill
struck Donna Snyder is totally irrelevant. It is worth noting
that the court never discussed this testimony. The other
three episodes are similar only in that they involve violence
to children in Grabill's family, but they involve different
children at significantly different ages and in different
social settings.66
Two of the bad acts involved excessive disciplinary
measures triggered by disobedience or misbehavior by children who were from four to seven years old. The most bizzarre testimony concerned Grabill's "exercise" to improve
his child's lungs by holding his hand over the child's mouth
and nose." No one will suggest this is a defensible act but
it does not prove either the intent or the motive of Alysia
Snyder's assailant. None of these instances are sufficiently
related to the offense charged to establish an exception to
63. Id.
64. Brief for Appellant, Grabill v. State, supra note 1.
65. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140 at 128.
66. A comparison of the evidence of bad acts admitted in Elliot v. State, supra
note 24, and those admitted in Grabill v. State, supra note 1, is instructive

on this point. In Elliott v. State the children involved were nine and eleven
years old. The incidents of previous sexual assaults by the defendant that
the children testified to were very similar. The defendant was described as
proceeding in a particular manner each time. In Grabill v. State, each act
of family violence was triggered by an unrelated and dissimilar event. The
victims included the mother, and children from the ages of six months to
four years. Two of the incidents involve excessive discipline for what
Grabill perceived as misbehavior. The incident involving the six month old
child is lurid, but neither the court nor the prosecution suggested why this
isolated incident of partial suffocation might shed light on the assault of
Alysia Snyder, who was struck in back of the head. The prosecution's theory
that Grabill lost his temper -whenever he heard a child cry is not advanced
by what appears to be a calculated act. Record on Appeal at 7. Grabill v.
State, supra note 1. No matter how cruel the act may seem, it does not
support any theory advanced under the Rule 404(b) exceptions.
1, at 808. 1981
note Scholarship,
State,ofsupra
67. Grabill
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Rule 404(b). At most, they show Grabill had a bad character and tended to treat his family members violently. This
is the very kind of evidence that is meant to excluded by
Rule 404 (b).
MOTIVE

Motive is not an element of any crime, but is instead a
relevant circumstantial fact from which elements of the
crime, such as intent, may be inferred. 8 Motive is an ambiguous term denoting a state of mind such as greed or
sexual desire that would cause a person to commit a specific
act."D During the motion in limine, the prosecution argued

that Grabill's four "acts" showed that he had a motive to
abuse the child. The prosecutor claimed the incidents showed
that Grabill had a short temper, and that when a child
cried, he would lose control of himself and strike him or
her. This theory was the basis for invoking the motive
exception to Rule 404(b).7

The Wyoming Supreme Court never discussed whether
or not the evidence could be admitted to show motive, mentioning motive only briefly in a general discussion of rule
404 (b).11 An examination of the evidence of prior bad acts
shows that only two instances of excessive discipline are at
all related to the prosecution's theory. Once again, both these
episodes involved children substantially older than Alysia
Snyder and both were in very different physical and social
settings.7"
Cases refusing to admit evidence to show motive are
rare.7" Nevertheless, the evidence must logically show the
existence of a motive that would cause the accused to commit
the charged act when faced with a particular set of circumstances.7" The prosecution's claim that the evidence tended
to establish a motive is not enough. In order to infer motive,
68.

LoUISELL & MUELLE, supra note 18, § 140 at 122.
Id. at 123.
Record on. Appeal at 3-7, Grabill v. State, supra note 1.
Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 808.
See note 66, supra.
73. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140 at 123.
74. 1 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 117 (3rd ed. .1940).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol16/iss2/11
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there must be substantial similarity between the collateral
offenses and the act charged. 5 Or else, a causal relationship
must be established, for instance, the need to cover up one
crime by committing another."6
Nothing in the testimony shows that the episodes of
excessive discipline were caused by a motive substantially
similar to the prosecution's hypothesis, or that a "short
temper" is a sufficiently specific mental state to qualify as
a motive. In fact, the "temper" argument is merely an attempt to cast evidence of Grabill's propensity for violence in
acceptable terminology without showing a clear motivating
cause for the actual abuse or the events that triggered it.
IDENTITY

The question of the identity of Alysia Snyder's assailant
is at the heart of the court's attempt to provide a foundation
for the admission of the evidence of unrelated family vilence." Yet, identity is nothing more than the conclusion
which can be drawn from the evidence of motive, plan,
design, or modus operandi. 8 In the opinions discussing it,
identity is normally discussed either in conjunction with one
of the other exceptions listed in Rule 404(b), or as a synonym for modus operandi or signature."9
The evidence in Grabill falls far short of the standard
for admission required to prove modus operandi or signature.
This exception requires that the collateral acts be uniquely
or distinctively similar to the crime charged so that the
accused's signature is plainly on the event."0 Acts that are
of doubtful similarity when used to show intent will certainly fail this more exacting test.
The court indicates several times that the primary fact
which would identify Alysia Snyder's assailant is the time
of the injury.8 The court's assertion that the evidence of
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United States v. Birns, 395 F.2d 943, 946 (6th Cir. 1968).
United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1975).
Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 809-10.
LOuISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140 at 144. See also United States v.
Wood, supra note 58, at 134.
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prior acts is helpful in making this determination is mystifying. The four acts are truly a diverse lot, unrelated in
time, place, or the people involved, and remote in time from
one another. Nothing in these previous instances of family
violence would help to pinpoint the moment of Alysia Snyder's
injury to within twenty minutes during October 31, 1979.
The evidence of prior bad acts does tend to prove the
identity of the perpetrator, but only by showing that Gilbert
Grabill had a propensity to "lose his temper" and strike
members of his family. This is exactly the kind of evidence
that should be prohibited by Rule 404(b).82 Rule 404(b)

excludes this kind of evidence not because it is not probative of issues in the case, but because its potential for
unfair prejudice is to great to allow the jury to consider
it."3 It should be noted that the weaker the prosecution's case
is, the greater the potential for unfair prejudice. 4 In
Grabill, the court recognizes the weakness of the state's
case, but fails to consider that the potential for prejudice
rises correspondingly. Rather than expanding and liberalizing the exception in Rule 404(b), under which evidence of
prior bad acts may be admitted, the court should carefully
scrutinize the purposes for which the evidence is offered.
ELLIOTT V. STATE

In upholding the conviction in Grabill, the Wyoming
Supreme Court relied heavily on Elliott v. State. 5 Both cases
presented similar, but not identical, problems of proof.8 " In
Grabill, the evidence that was offered to show which parent
abused the child was entirely circumstantial and was based
solely on the testimony of the parents, one of whom committed the crime.8 7 In Elliott, the problem was whether or
not to believe a nine year old girl who accused Elliott of
sexual assault. The evidence of previous sexual assaults upon
80. Id. at 142-43.
81. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 806, 807, 809.
82. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, §§ 136, 140.
83. Id., § 136.
84. Id., § 140 at 116, 120.
85. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 810-11.
86. Id. at 810.
87. Id. at 809-10.
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the victim's sister was used to corroborate a direct allegation by a witness to the crime. The need for verification in
Elliott arose because the witness was a child and her testimony was contradicted. 8
A comparison of Elliott and Grabill is instructive on
two points. First, in Elliott, there was direct testimony by
the victim, coupled with additional medical testimony indicating the child had been assaulted.89 Consequently, the evidence of the previous sexual assaults did not carry the same
burden of proof as did the evidence in Grabill, where it was
the only evidence offered to help sort out the parents' conflicting testimony. Second, the prior acts of sexual assault
allowed in evidence in Elliott are nearly identical to the
assault charged.9" Since the incidents are truly similar, it is
proper for the court to discern a modus operandi or plan on
the part of the accused. 1
These differences in the nature or quality of the testimony in the two cases indicate that the potential for unfair
prejudice was far less in Elliott than it was in Grabill. In
this respect, the holding in Grabill is an exaggeration of
the holding in Elliott. The admission of evidence of prior
bad acts in Grabill crosses the line into the realm of unfair
prejudice prohibited by Rule 403.
CHILD ABUSE

& THE EVIDENCE PROBLEM

Child abuse and infanticide cases frequently present
difficult problems of proof.2 These arise primarily from a
lack of evidence, since the abusive act usually takes place
in the home without any witnesses.9 3 In this respect, Grabill
is a typical child abuse case.
"We think. . . that when the crime is one of infanticide
or child abuse, evidence of repeated incidents is especially
relevant because it may be the only evidence to prove the
88. Elliott v. State, supra note 24, at 1047, 1048.
89. Id. at 1045, 1046.
90. Id. at 1045-1047.

91. Id. at 1050 (concurring opinion).
92. See Note, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions, 63

GEO. L. J. 257, 259 (1974).
93. Id.
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crime.""' This quotation from United States v. Woods, 5 a
case cited by the court in Grabill,is a fair assessment of the
difficulties of proof in child abuse cases. On the other hand,
the greater the need for evidence of prior bad acts to be
admitted to prove the case, the more the danger of unfair
prejudice increases. 6 In Elliott and in Grabill, the court
appears to be giving greater weight to the probative value
of evidence and less weight to the danger of prejudice, not
because the evidence is reliable but because there is no other
evidence available.
In order to provide evidence to prove the crime in
Grabill, the court extended the doctrine it announced in
Elliott. In Elliott, the exception to the prohibition of evidence of prior acts in Rule 404(b) was limited to corroborating testimony of a witness-victim who also was a child."
More importantly, the evidence clearly qualified under the
plan or modus operandi exceptions to Rule 404(b),98 while
in Grabill, the evidence of prior bad acts provides the only
evidence other than the contradictory testimony of the
parents.9 In allowing this evidence, the court indicated that
in child abuse and sexual assault cases the standard for
admission under Rule 404(b) will be less stringent than
it has been traditionally.
While the court relied almost exclusively on Elliott to
extend the rule to fit the facts of Grabill,'" the only truly
analogous case cited in Grabillis Woods. Though Woods contains many interesting parallels to Grabill, unlike Grabill
the evidence of prior acts admitted in Woods is extensive
and nearly identical to the charged offense. Because of this,
94. United States v. Woods, 484 F.2d 127, 133 (4th Cir. 1973).
95. Id. [Hereinafter cited in the text as Woods].
96. LOUISELL & MUELLER, supra note 18, § 140 at 120.
97. Elliott v. State, supra note 24, at 1045.
98. Id. at 1051 (concurring opinion).
99. Grabill v. State, supra note 1, at 810.
100. Id. at 810-11.
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the probative value of this evidence was very high, and the
potential for unfair prejudice was low.' 0 '
The same cannot be said of the evidence of prior bad
acts admitted in Grabill. Here, the limitations found in
Rule 403 and Rule 404(b) have been ignored, resulting in
admission of unfairly prejudicial evidence. The focus of the
court's inquiry should be on determining whether or not
one of the exceptions to the general rule of 404(b) should
apply, not on supplementing sparse evidence available to
prove the crime. It is not the function of Rule 404(b) to
supply evidence for a weak case.
To properly apply Rule 404(b), the court should require that the evidence of previous bad acts clearly shows
the existence of a disputed issue or, that the evidence should
show a sufficiently specific motive from which a disputed
issue can be inferred when coupled with the other facts of
the case. In order to establish intent, motive, plan, signature,
or modus operandi, the evidence of previous acts must bear
a substantial similarity to that of the charged offense.
Finally, the court should remember that as the need for the
evidence of unrelated acts increases, the danger of unfair
prejudice rises proportionately. Under these circumstances,
it is not proper for the court to allow evidence of the accused's
propensity to commit the criminal act even if it is the only
evidence available. Nor is it appropriate when applying
Rule 403 for the court to give greater weight to the probative value of evidence of prior bad acts simply because
there is an absence of evidence to prove the case.
D. M. KLINE

101. United States v. Woods, supra note 94, was a prosecution for infanticide by
suffocation. The prosecution sought to have evidence admitted that children
who were under the care of the defendant had suffered from cyanosis or
oxygen starvation. Evidence of twenty separate instances of cyanosis was
admitted. Of the nine children who had suffered from these attacks of
cyanosis, seven had died. The evidence also showed that none of the children had ever suffered from the malady except when they were in Mrs.
Woods care. The similarity and frequency of these incidents set them apart
theArchive
evidence
Grabill v. State.
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